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RECENT CASES
Bargaining units comprised solely of RNs are appropriate under the
traditional community of interest test as well as under the St. Francis
disparity of interest test, if it means taking into account public interest
in avoiding undue proliferation of bargaining units. RN only units should
be presumptively appropriate to discourage unnecessary delay and expense
in litigation. If a disparity of interest or public interest factor is to be
added to the Board's determinations of appropriate units in the health care
industry, the Supreme Court needs to direct the Board to use such a test,
after explaining what it is, and how to use it. The present disagreement
between the Board and the courts of appeal is harmful to employees, em-
ployers, and the public they serve; it benefits only labor lawyers.
JACQULYN K. GIDEON
THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT-A "FABLED" RIGHT
RECEIVES JUDICIAL RECOGNITION IN MISSOURI
Eckerhart v. Hensley"
Nineteen years after doctor-lawyer Morton Birnbaum first urged rec-
ognition of a constitutional right to treatment for involuntarily hospitalized
mental patients, 2 that right has received judicial endorsement in Missouri.
In Eckerhart v. Hensley, Judge Elmo Hunter of the Western District of
Missouri Federal Court held that there does exist such a right.3 This hold-
ing is significant because Eckerhart is one of few cases declaring the
existence of this constitutional right after the United States Supreme
Court declined to pass upon its existence.4 In addition, Eckerhart extends
the right to a class of patients (those found to be dangerous) who gen-
erally had been regarded as outside its reach;5 it sets up a potential
conflict with Missouri state courts; 6 and the court appears to have
course, one union may well represent more than one unit, but combined negotia-
tions are likely in such a situation. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE,
IMPACr OF THE 1974 HEALTH CAPE AmMENDMXENT TO THE NLRA ON COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 477 (1979).
1. 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
2. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
8. 475 F. Supp. at 915.
4. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974); Birn-
baum, supra note 2, at 503.
6. See notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text infra.
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
successfully avoided many of the problems encountered in previous attempts
to implement the right.7
Patients of the forensic unit at Fulton State Hospital filed a class
action suit against administrators of the Missouri Department of Mental
Health and alleged they were being confined in violation of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution by being denied their con-
stitutional right to adequate treatment.8 They sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief. The forensic unit of Fulton State Hospital includes a
maximum security unit known as the Marion 0. Biggs Building for the
Criminally Insane and a less restrictive area known as the Rehabilitation
Unit.0 Patients housed in both buildings have been determined to repre-
sent a danger to themselves or others.10 Pursuant to regulations of the De-
partment of Mental Health, all patients within the class represented 1
who resided in the Biggs building were required to have had an adminis-
trative hearing to determine their need for maximum security either be-
fore or immediately after their placement there.' 2
The court ruled that a constitutional right to treatment exists under
the fourteenth amendment and that this right extends to these patients
who had been found to be dangerous. Acknowledging that the Constitution
does not mandate "optimal" or "good" treatment, the court said:
The patient committed against his will has a constitutional right
only to that treatment as is minimally adequate to provide him a
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental con-
7. The problems encountered in implementing the right in one case are
discussed in Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering
Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 138, 1378-79 (1975). Such problems caused
one of its champions, Chief Judge David Bazelon, to refer to it as a "fabled" right.
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Ci. L. REv. 742, 743
(1969). See also note 22 infra.
8. 475 F. Supp at 912. Plaintiffs also presented a claim based on the eighth
amendment, alleging they were being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment,
but the court did not reach this claim. Id. at 915 n.16.
The author was employed as a psychiatric social worker in the forensic unit
during five years of this eight-year litigation.
9. Id. at 911.
10. Id.
11. Voluntary patients and those committed to the forensic unit for pre-
trial psychiatric examination were excluded from the class. Id. n.1.
12. These regulations were promulgated in settlement of prior litigation
in the same court by patients against administrators of the forensic unit. See
Barnes v. Hill, No. 1821 (W.D. Mo., Dec. 3, 1973); Williams v. Hill, No. 1827
(W.D. Mo., Dec. 3, 1973). Cf. Baxtrom v. Herold, 3883 U.S. 107 (1966) (Supreme
Court found unconstitutional a New York law permitting automatic assignment
to a maximum security facility for a mentally ill convict at the expiration of
his sentence).
Half of the patients in the forensic unit had been committed after being found
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and the other half consisted of
patients committed under a variety of criminal and civil procedures, including
civil commitments by probate court, commitment for pre-trial psychiatric ex-
amination, criminal sexual psychopath commitments, incompetent to proceed with
trial commitments, transfers from the Missouri Department of Corrections, and a
few juvenile court and voluntary commitments. 475 F. Supp. at 912.
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RECENT CASES
dition .... Essential elements of minimally adequate treatment
include a humane physical and psychological treatment environ-
ment, sufficient numbers of qualified staff, and an individual-
ized treatment plan for each patient.'3
The court went on to find that this minimal standard was not met in
the forensic unit except as to staff. The court ruled constitutionally in-
adequate several aspects of the physical environment of the Biggs build-
ing.14 It stated that throughout the forensic unit treatment plans in exist-
ence were minimally adequate, but found there were impermissible delays
in the preparation and review of treatment plans.1 5 The court made
additional findings of constitutional violations, and although it could have
linked these to the right to treatment, it did not explicitly do so. 16 These
violations included a failure to transfer patients promptly to a less re-
strictive environment after they were approved for such a transfer,17 visit-
ing and telephone policies in the Biggs building so restrictive as to amount
to punishment,' 8 and seclusion sometimes being used in the forensic unit
for disciplinary rather than therapeutic reasons.' 9
To fashion a remedy for the constitutional violations found, the
Eckerhart court retained jurisdiction and ordered a conference at which
defendants were to submit a plan to correct the deficiencies.20 In so do-
ing, the court admitted it was "ill-equipped to deal with the complex
problems of administering the maximum security unit of a state mental
hospital"21 and acknowledged an obligation to defer whenever possible to
the administrators of such facilities.22
13. 475 F. Supp. at 915.
14. The deficiencies found were in: climate control; privacy provisions in
the lavatories, bathrooms, and dormitories; protection from assault in the dormi-
tories; furnishings; and arrangements for patients to keep and display personal
belongings. Id. at 917-19.
15. Id. at 922.
16. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
wherein all the violations found in Eckerhart were among those listed as falling
within the right to treatment.
17. 475 F. Supp. at 922. The court found that a patient could remain in the
Biggs building for up to eight months after being recommended for transfer
out. Id. See also Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
18. 475 F. Supp. at 925.
19. The court did not forbid the use of seclusion for disciplinary reasons,
but imposed minimal procedural requirements for such use, following the guide-
lines given by the Supreme Court in the prison case of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). 475 F. Supp. at 928.
All of the court's findings of constitutional violations rested on the fourteenth
amendment. The scope of the new right is unclear and likely to remain so
pending further litigation. This article will focus on the question of its existence
rather than on its scope.
20. 475 F. Supp. at 928.
21. Id. at 915.
22. Id. Judge Hunter used a very similar restrained approach recently when
asked to pass upon the constitutionality of conditions at the Missouri State Peni-
tentiary. For this moderation he received praise from the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. See Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Mo. 1978), affd sub nom.
1980]
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Judicial reluctance to embrace the "new," 23 "fabled," 24 and "nas-
cent''25 right to treatment has been caused in part by criticism that courts
would be invading an area outside their competence. 26 It has been argued
that psychiatry itself has not reached agreement about treatment methods,
2
'
and that identifying treatment as a constitutionally mandated right would
inappropriately substitute moral judgments of the judiciary for legal re-
quirements.2 8 Society's ambivalent attitude toward the mentally ill has
complicated the matter.20
Birnbaum's original proposal that a constitutional right to treatment
be recognized was apparently limited to civilly committed mental pa-
tients. 30 The rationale suggested was substantive due process as per Jus-
tice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Solesbee v. Balkcom:31
It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process
Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so
deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as
to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by
our whole history. Due process is that which comports with the
deepest notions of what is fair and right and just. The more funda-
mental the beliefs are the less likely they are to be explicitly stated.
Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979). In declining to issue a detailed
injunction to remedy the constitutional deficiencies in the forensic unit, Judge
Hunter has shown a reluctance to follow the course taken by Judge Frank John-
son in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), upon which Judge
Hunter relied heavily to find that a consitutional right to treatment does exist.
23. Editorial, A New Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516 (1960).
24. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742,
743 (1969).
25. Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967).
26. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 588 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-43
N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Gir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057
1975); Position Statement on the Question' of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 Azs.
J. PsYcH. 1458 (1967). But see Position Statement on the Right to Adequate Care
and Treatment for the Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded, 134 AMv. J. PsYCH.
354 (1977), wherein the American Psychiatric Association reversed its earlier posi-
tion and endorsed the idea of a constitutional right to treatment.
27. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 588 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-43
(N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975). Also, the very existence of a medical phenomenon of mental illness has
been questioned in recent years. See Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 734
(1969).
28. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
29. "Opposing wishes to neglect and to care, to protect and to abandon, can
be identified in involuntary commitment proceedings; therefore, no conflict-free
resolution of the problems inherent in such deprivations of liberty is possible."
Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. Cm. L. REv.
755, 755 (1969).
30. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 503.
31. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
[Vol. 45
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But respect for them is of the very essence of the Due Process
Clause.3 2
The first case to recognize a right to treatment did so on statutory
grounds. Rouse v. Cameron33 was a habeas corpus proceeding by a pa-
tient who had been committed after being found not guilty by reason of
insanity of carrying a dangerous weapon. Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion
recognized a statutory right to treatment under the District of Columbia
Code,3 4 but in dicta noted that failure to provide treatment raised con-
stitutional questions of due process, equal protection, and cruel and un-
usual punishment.35 The court, in defining the right, stated, "The hos-
pital need not show that the treatment will cure or improve him, but only
that there is a bona fide effort to do so . . . . The effort should be to
provide treatment which is adequate in light of present knowledge."3 6 The
case was remanded to the district court for a determination of whether
patient Rouse was receiving adequate treatment, and the court of appeals
suggested that release be considered "if it appears that the opportunity for
treatment has been exhausted or treatment is otherwise inappropriate."3 7
Other guidelines expressed by the court, that continued confinement must
depend on the patient's mental condition and not dangerousness alone,3 8
and that failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment could not be
justified by lack of staff or facilities,3 9 were explicitly based on statutory
provisions, as was the application of this right to a criminally committed
patient.40
The first 41 case to recognize a constitutional right to treatment was
Wyatt v. Stickney.4 2 This lengthy litigation unfolded over a period of
several years and represents the highwater mark in development of a con-
stitutional right to treatment. Judge Frank Johnson of the Alabama
32. Id. at 16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoted in Birnbaum, supra note
2, at 503. Birnbaum suggested that the courts use standards set by the American
Psychiatric Association as guides in reviewing the adequacy of treatment. Birn-
baum, supra note 2, at 504. To enforce the right to treatment, he recommended
the courts order the release of patients found not to be receiving adequate treat-
ment. Id. at 503. He also discussed the possibility of a patient seeking damages
for being denied this right. Id. at 503-04 n.28.
A variety of rationales for the right to treatment have been advanced since
Birnbaum's original proposal. See generally Developments in the Law-Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1324-33 (1974).
33. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
34. Id. at 453-54.
35. Id. at 453.
36. Id. at 456.
37. Id. at 458-59.
38. Id. at 459.
39. Id. at 457.
40. Id. at 454.
41. It is not clear whether the earlier case of Nason v. Superintendent of
Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968), was based on
constitutional or statutory grounds. See Birnbaum, Some Remarks on "The Right
to Treatment," 23 ALA. L. Rrv. 623, 624 n.4 (1971).
42. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
1980]
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Middle District Federal Court issued four separate opinions in the case dur-
ing 1971 and 1972. 43 The Fifth Circuit, in a 1974 opinion, affirmed all of
the essential parts of Judge Johnson's rulings.44 Wyatt 'was a class action
suit brought against various Alabama officials on behalf of patients in
three Alabama mental institutions.45 The patients involved were committed
involuntarily through noncriminal procedures.4 6 Without acknowledging
the statutory basis for the holding in Rouse, the Wyatt court relied pri-
marily on that case in ruling that treatment is "the only justification, from
a constitutional standpoint, that allows civil commitments to mental in-
stitutions."147
The second Wyatt opinion is the source of the three "essential ele-
ments of minimally adequate treatment" identified in Eckerhart.48 With
the help of several distinguished amid 49 the court identified as necessary
for any adequate treatment program in a public mental institution: "(1) a
humane psychological and physical environment, (2) qualified staff in
numbers sufficient to administer adequate treatment and (8) individualized
treatment plans."5 0 The defendants subsequently failed to submit a satis-
factory plan or make satisfactory progress toward protecting the patients'
right to treatment and, after a further hearing, the court issued and
ordered implementation of very detailed standards. The order specified
size requirements for rooms, temperature requirements for the buildings,
nutritional standards for hospital food, staff-to-patient ratios for all dis-
ciplines, and requirements for written treatment plans.51
Wyatt was appealed to the Fifth Circuit where the existence of a
constitutional right to treatment was contested. Appellants had conceded
43. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
Ala. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
44. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. When the first opinion was issued, Alabama ranked fiftieth among the
states in per patient expenditures. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D.
Ala. 1971).
46. Id.; Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Judge John-
son stated the rationale for this constitutional right to treatment thus: "To deprive
any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is
for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment
violates the very fundamentals of due process." Id. at 785.
48. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
49. The United States, the American Psychological Association, the American
Orthopsychiatric Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union had joined
the case as amici. When the last district court opinions were issued, the American
Association on Mental Deficiency also had joined. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp.
373, 375 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Also, the plaintiffs had retained Morton Birnbaum.
Id. at 374.
50. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
51. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972). For men-
tally retarded patients at one of the hospitals, the court found an analogous
"right to habilitation," Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
and issued closely parallel standards. Id. at 395-407. This right, however, was not
actively contested. Id. at 390.
[Vol. 45
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that should such a right be found, the standards set by the district court
were appropriate. 52 The Fifth Circuit explicitly based its resolution of
the constitutional issue on its decision earlier the same year in Donaldson
v. O'Conner,53 and held that "the right to treatment arises as a matter
of federal constitutional law under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 54 This holding was limited to civilly committed pa-
tients,5 5 and the court explained its findings thus: "Our express holding
in Donaldson and here rests on the quid pro quo concept of 'rehabilitative
treatment, or where rehabilitation is impossible, minimally adequate ha-
bilitation and care, beyond the subsistence level custodial care that would
be provided in a penitentiary.' "56
Donaldson is the only right to treatment case to reach the Supreme
Court. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,57 the Court declined to pass upon the
existence of a constitutional right to treatment, saying the case did not
raise the constitutional issues addressed by the Fifth Circuit.58 Instead, the
Court disposed of the case on the basis of a violation of Donaldson's con-
stitutional right to liberty. 59 Donaldson was civilly committed to a Florida
state hospital and remained there involuntarily for fifteen years with a
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Uncontradicted evidence established
that he was not and had never been dangerous, 6 0 that his confinement
was simple custodial care without treatment, 61 and that "responsible per-
sons [were] willing to provide him any care he might need on release."0 2
The hospital superintendent, however, had refused to allow his release. 63
The action reviewed by the Supreme Court was a suit for damages under
52. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1974). The court
later stated:
[T]he parties and amici stipulated to a number of specific conditions they
agreed were necessary for a constitutionally acceptable minimum treat-
ment program. Because of these stipulations, we need not and do not
reach decision as to whether the standards prescribed by the district court
are constitutionally minimum requirements, or whether it is within the
province of a federal district court .. . to prescribe standards as dis-
tinguished from enjoining the operation of such institutions while con-
stitutional rights are being violated.
Id. at 1316-17.
53. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Morton Birn-
baum also served as attorney for the plaintiff in this case. See id. at 509; Birnbaum,
supra note 41, at 635-37 n.26.
54. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. Id. at 1313.
56. Id. at 1314 (quoting Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir.
1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)).
57. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
58. Id. at 573.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 567-68.
61. Id. at 568.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the trial court level the jury had awarded Donaldson
$38,500, including $10,000 in punitive damages. 64
The Fifth Circuit affirmed this judgment, finding a constitutional
right to treatment based on fourteenth amendment due process. 65 In an
exhaustive opinion, the court identified three recognized grounds for in-
voluntary civil commitment: danger to others ("police power" commit-
ment); need for care or treatment (parens patriae commitment); and dan-
ger to self (mixed "police power" and parens patriae commitment).6
The court identified two parts to the theory of a constitutional right to
treatment. The first part is that if a commitment is on parens patriae
grounds, the Constitution requires that minimally adequate treatment
be given.67 The second part, which does not distinguish between parens
patriae and police power grounds for commitment, is that when detention
is not for retributive purposes, is not limited to a fixed term, and funda-
mental procedural safeguards are not observed, there must be a quid pro
quo extended by the government to justify confinement.68 This quid pro
quo, the court said, was "the provision of rehabilitative treatment, or
where rehabilitation is impossible, minimally adequate habilitation and
care." 60 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously vacated the Fifth Cir-
cuit's judgment on executive immunity grounds70 and explicitly deprived
that court's opinion of any precedential effect.7 1 The Court did not dis-
turb the jury's finding that Donaldson's constitutional right to freedom
had been violated,7 2 and specifically declined to rule on the existence of
a constitutional right to treatment or to determine upon what grounds a
mentally ill person may be confined. 73 The Court stated its constitutional
holding thus: "[A] State cannot constitutionally confine without more
a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in free-
doin . ...
In a concurrence to O'Connor, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that
64. Id. at 572. Cf. Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl.
1968) (patient hospitalized for more than 12 years received award of $300,000 in suit
for medical malpractice based on allegations of failure to provide treatment, false
imprisonment, and injuries from beatings by employees and other patients).
65. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422
U.S. 563 (1975).
66. Id. at 520-21.
67. Id. at 521.
68. Id. at 522.
69. Id.
70. 422 U.S. at 577. The Court remanded so it could be determined whether
O'Connor reasonably should have known he was violating Donaldson's constitu-
* tional rights. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
71. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975).
72. Id. at 576.
73. Id. at 573-75.
74. Id. at 576. The Court also stated: "A finding of 'mental illness' alone
cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will and keeping him
indefinitely in simple custodial confinement." Id. at 575.
[Vol. 45
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the Court's opinion gave no approval to the existence of a constitutional
right to treatment and asserted that such a finding had no basis in the
decisions of the Supreme Court.75 Burger was harshly critical of the Fifth
Circuit's quid pro quo rationale, saying it was "a sharp departure from, and
cannot coexist with, due process principles." 76 Rather, said Burger,
"[t]here can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a
state may confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of
significant antisocial acts." 77
In Eckerhart, Judge Hunter relied heavily on Rouse and Wyatt, and
gave consideration to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Donaldson in con-
cluding that a constitutional right to treatment exists. 78 As demonstrated,
however, these cases do not have substantial precedential weight after the
Supreme Court's opinion in O'Connor: Rouse was based on statute; Wyatt's
affirmance was based on Donaldson; and Donaldson was vacated. Also,
neither Birnbaum's original proposal nor any of these major cases pro-
vides support for extending this right, if it exists at all, to dangerous
patients.
Eckerhart relied heavily on the 1977 Eighth Circuit opinion in Welsch
v. Likins,7 9 which also provides only weak support for a constitutional
right to treatment. The issue of the existence of such a right did not reach
the Eighth Circuit, but the court accepted the unchallenged declaration by
the trial court that a federal constitutional right to treatment existed for
the mentally retarded patients who were plaintiffs.8 0 The trial court had
followed the pattern set by Judge Johnson in Wyatt, and had issued a
detailed order setting twenty-seven specific requirements and prohibitions
for the hospital involved.81 In a footnote, the Eighth Circuit opinion as-
serted that "the constitutional right of a noncriminal committed to a
mental institution to be treated for his condition is probably clearer" than
when the trial court's unchallenged declaration of such a right was issued
in 1974.82 As demonstrated in the preceding paragraph, however, this as-
sertion is questionable. Moreover, the facts in Welsch differ significantly
from those in Eckerhart. In Welsch only noncriminal retardees were
75. Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Court's opinion, however,
does not compel this conclusion. Four days after O'Connor was decided, the Courtdenied certiorari in the Burnham case. Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health,
349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975). In Burnham, the Fifth Circuit had reversed thedistrict court's refusal to find a constitutional right to treatment, basing that action
on the authority of its decisions in Donaldson and Wyatt. 503 F.2d at 1319.
76. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring).
77. Id. at 582-83.
78. 475 F. Supp. at 912-13.
79. 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
80. Id. at 1125-26.
81. Id. at 1126.
82. Id. n.6, quoted in Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. at 913 n.13.
1980]
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involved, whereas criminally committed mentally ill patients constituted
the bulk of the plaintiff class in Eckerhart.8 3
In its extension of the right to treatment to dangerous patients,
Eckerhart found support in an Ohio case which applied the right to a
remarkably similar plaintiff class. In that case, however, the existence
of the right was not contested, and the case has not received appellate
review. The residents of Ohio's maximum security mental institution
sued administrators for injunctive and declaratory relief. In a 1974 opinion,
an Ohio federal district court announced recognition of a constitutional
right to treatment for the patients there involved. Both sides took the
position that such a right existed, however, and merely asked the court
to define its parameters.8 4 The court, explicitly following Judge Johnson's
lead in Wyatt,8 5 proceeded to issue detailed standards for operation of the
hospital.8 0 In a later enforcing order the court noted that the patients in-
volved were committed under a variety of criminal and civil proceedings8 7
and acknowledged their dangerousness.88
Although limited additional lower court support exists for the hold-
ing in Eckerhart,80 no strong appellate precedent exists. For this reason,
because the existence of a constitutional right to treatment was vigorously
contested in Eckerhart, and because it extended the right to dangerous
patients, Eckerhart is properly seen as being at the very forefront of the
development of this significant doctrine. The opinion's presentation of it-
self as resting on precedent obscures this position. Because of its position
in constitutional evolution, the case must be analyzed with regard to the
current need for such a development.
During the halting progress of the right to treatment, a simultaneous
liberalization of mental health commitment laws has weakened the ra-
tionale for its existence. Some states, including Missouri, have eliminated
purely parens patriae involuntary civil commitments, requiring that dan-
83. 475 F. Supp. at 912. The Eighth Circuit also has ruled that a petition
alleging lack of adequate medical treatment at St. Louis State School and Hospital
states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801 (8th
Cir. 1978).
84. Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1203-12.
87. Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 849-50 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
88. Id. at 856. Extending the right to treatment to mentally ill criminals
was advocated in Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 784, 798 (1969), but the author acknowledged that such a proposal raised
serious questions about the appropriateness of any institutionalization. Id. at 801.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (D. Conn. 1973)(cursory discussion); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1329-30 (M.D. Ala. 1973)(dicta); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686, 687 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (dicta).
Although cited in Eckerhart, 475 F. Supp. at 914, for the proposition that the
right to treatment had been recognized for patients similar to the plaintiffs, Pardue
and Davy are addressed to an untreatable patient's right to liberty, and Stachulak
was merely a pre-trial discovery order.
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gerousness in some form be found as a prerequisite to commitment. 90 Some
states, again including Missouri, have by statute adopted some form of a
right to treatment in their civil commitment laws.91 For criminal commit-
ments, some states have eliminated, either by statute or by court decision,
automatic commitments for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity,
and require additional findings of current mental illness and dangerous-
ness before commitment is allowed. 92 Missouri has not done so.93 In Mis-
souri and elsewhere when a statutory right to treatment has been enacted,
it generally has not been made applicable to criminally committed or
dangerous patients. 94 In states where this has occurred, therefore, it is in
the area of police power or criminal commitments that there remains a
possible need for a judicially protectible right to treatment. Eckerhart's
ruling operates in precisely this area.
The holding in Eckerhart sets up a potential conflict with Missouri
state courts. Missouri courts have repeatedly refused release to patients
considered not to be mentally ill who were committed under the police
power. 95 In so doing the courts have aligned themselves with Chief Justice
90. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902 (1976); RSMo §§ 202.123.2, 135.5,
137.1, 145.1 (1978). But see ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1401 (A), (B), (C), -1409,
-1410 (Supp. 1979) (allowing involuntary hospitalization of those found to be
"homicidal," "suicidal," or "gravely disabled," but for the "gravely disabled"
limiting the commitment to 30 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 912, § 1-119 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979); IowA CoDE ANN. §§ 229.1 (2), .13 (West Supp. 1979).
91. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 229.23 (West Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59-2927, -2929 (1979); RSMo §§ 202.205 to .215 (1978).
92. See generally Note, Criminal Procedure-Automatic Commitment of
Defendants Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 41 Mo. L. R.v. 439 (1976).
93. RSMo § 552.040 (1) (1978), which provides for automatic commitment,
has remained virtually unchanged since it was enacted in 1963. In State v. Kee,
510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. En Banc 1974), the Missouri Supreme Court upheld §
552.040 (1) against a constitutional challenge.
94. Missouri's new statutory right to treatment is a part of the civil com-
mitment statutes. See RSMo § 202.205 (1978). The criminal commitment statute,
RSMo ch. 552 (1978), contains no such provision. The wording of § 202.205, how-
ever, might allow it to be interpreted as applying to criminally committed pa-
tients. Cf. IKAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2937 (1976) (explicitly makes the provisions of
that civil commitment statute, including a "Right to Humane Treatment," id.
§ 59-2927, inapplicable to persons in custody on a criminal charge). Kansas'
criminal commitment statutes contain no standards for treatment of patients com-
mitted thereunder. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3428 to -3428a (Supp. 1979), and
§§ 22-3429 to -3431 (1974).
95. In State v. James, 534 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1976), the Missouri Supreme Court
unanimously recognized that the patient-appellant who had been committed to
the Biggs building as a criminal sexual psychopath possibly could not be cured,
but ruled that his continued involuntary confinement was not unconstitutional.
In State v. Davee, 558 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977), the hospital
superintendent had petitioned the court for the release of a patient who had
been acquitted because of insanity; psychiatrists testified that the patient "does
not need any active treatment for mental illness" and that he was "not presently
suffering from an overt psychosis." Id. at 339. The court of appeals, however,
quoted Burger's concurrence in O'Connor, id. at 340, and against a constitutional
argument upheld and applied the two requirements of RSMo § 552.040 (1969),
that release be granted only if the patient is shown to be both free from mental
illness and not dangerous to himself or others. 558 S.W.2d at 339.
1980]
11
Powell: Powell: Right to Treatment-A Fabled Right Receives Judicial Recognition
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Burger's position in O'Connor, twice quoting his statement that "there
can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a State
may confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of
significant antisocial acts." 96 This potential conflict may be avoided if
the Missouri cases are read as dealing with patients described by Judge
Hunter as "not reasonably likely to benefit from treatment" but still
dangerous, for whom he said involuntary hospitalization is not unconsti-
tutional.9 7 The rationale of Eckerhart,98 however, bears a close resemblance
to the quid pro quo rationale which Burger was criticizing and a real dis-
agreement over the proper role of the courts appears to exist. Missouri
courts have shown an unwillingness to expand mental patients' rights
absent legislative action, especially for criminally committed patients.99
Resolving this difference over the proper role of courts in this area would
seem to require action by the Supreme Court.
At some future date the Supreme Court may pronounce that after
years of labor, the nascent right to treatment has been stillborn. Given
the limited progress made thus far by this right, such a pronouncement
would seem justified. Pending such a pronouncement, however, when pe-
titioned by neglected mental patients who are without statutory protection
from neglect, the courts remain free to offer their protection. The Ecker-
hart court found unacceptably inadequate treatment in Missouri's mental
health system and moved to correct the situation by declaring that a
The Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, has ruled that neither improper
treatment nor maximum benefit from hospitalization suffices to warrant release
of a patient committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity. State v.
Pertuisot, 547 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977). While affirming the
denial of a hospital request for permission to release a patient who had re-
mained free of psychosis for the last seven of the fourteen years since his com-
mitment as not guilty by reason of insanity, the same court stated, "proof that the
condition which originally caused the commitment has been cured does not per se
entitle the defendant to be released." State v. Montague, 510 S.W.2d 776, 778
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
A common thread in these Missouri cases is that the burden of establishing
facts to support his release is on the confined patient. State v. Davee, 558 S.W.2d
335, 338 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); State v. Pertuisot, 547 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1977); State v. Montague, 510 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1974).
96. State v. James, 534 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo. 1976); State v. Davee, 558
S.W.2d 335, 340 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977) (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C. J. concurring)).
97. 475 F. Supp. at 914-15.
98. Judge Hunter's rationale is that "[c]onfinement in a state mental hos-
pital absolutely forecloses receipt of any treatment except that which the state
chooses to provide . . . . To withhold all opportunity for treatment may con-
demn [the mental patient] to a lifetime of hopeless mental illness." Id. at 914.
In addition, "[t]he fact that plaintiffs have been deemed dangerous does not de-
prive them of a constitutional right to treatment .... On the contrary, if a mental
patient is involuntarily confined because he is dangerous, due process requires a
specific focus to the treatment which is his right." Id. at 915.
99. See State v. Kee, 510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. En Banc 1974); Note, supra note
92; cases discussed in note 95 supra.
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